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Susan M. Collins and Francesco Giavazzi 
An  influential view of  why the Bretton Woods system eventually collapsed 
points to the widening gap between European and American views on the 
desirable rate of inflation during the late 1960s. Reflecting on the tensions that 
characterized the economic relations between Europeans-Germans  in partic- 
ular-and  Americans at that time, Harry Johnson (1973,205) wrote, “SO long 
as the United States maintained reasonable price stability, it suited the other 
major countries to live with the international financial dominance of the dol- 
lar, . . . [but] once the United States became a potent source of world infla- 
tion, the question naturally arose of establishing a basis for common action to 
resist imported inflation.” At  the same time, Bundesbank president Otmar 
Emminger’s (1977, 53) description of the necessary conditions for the viabil- 
ity of a fixed exchange rate system vividly illustrated the thinking that led to 
the end of  the Bretton Woods era: “a system of fixed . . . rates could only 
function so long as the key-currency country, by its domestic stability-i.e., 
monetary stability and economic stability in general-enables  the other mem- 
ber countries to maintain fixed exchange rates without imposing undue strains 
on their own domestic stability.” 
Similarly, behind the failure of  the European attempts to create an area of 
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exchange rate stability in the mid-1970s’ lie divergent views on the role of 
inflation in helping the European economies steer through the rough waters 
of  that decade. Commenting on the Italian exchange rate policy of  1976-78 
(which would eventually lead to an inflation rate twice as high as the European 
average), the governor of the Bank of Italy wrote, “Though aware of  its role 
in shaping the dynamics of prices, we guided the external value of the lira so 
as to permit a growth of exports setting the premises for a recovery of  accu- 
mulation  and  of  employment less conditioned by  the external constraint” 
(Banca d’Italia, Annual Report, 1979)-a  view to which even a German cen- 
tral banker during the time of the “locomotive experiment” would hardly have 
subscribed. 
These experiences confirm that  common attitudes toward inflation are a 
necessary  condition  for  the  viability  of  a  fixed  exchange  rate  system. 
Throughout the  1960s, Germany faced the choice between achieving its do- 
mestic inflation targets and behaving according to the rules of Bretton Woods. 
Eventually, the cost of  an inflation rate that was constantly “too high” con- 
vinced Germans that a regime of  flexible exchange rates was “the only one 
able to guarantee domestic price stability.”* 
These experiences also suggest that the success of the European Monetary 
System (EMS) in creating an area of exchange rate stability in Europe-made 
possible by the convergence of inflation rates toward the German level-may 
be the result of  an unprecedented convergence of  attitudes toward inflation 
throughout the Continent.  (Figure  12.1~  shows that countries that  had  re- 
mained in the Snake3 maintained low  inflation differentials relative to Ger- 
many from the end of the 1970s, while figure 12. lb  shows that inflation rates 
in other European countries did not begin to converge toward German levels 
until the mid-1980s.) From this viewpoint, the various phases of  the EMS 
experience could reflect the timing of such a shift in attitudes. The system was 
originally set up in March 1979 by seven countries, and it is commonly rec- 
ognized that, until 1982-83,  it effectively functioned like a crawling peg: each 
member maintained its own inflation rate, and realignments were the mecha- 
nism to correct the large swings in real exchange rates that the system gener- 
ated regularly. But then, one after the other, the high-inflation members of the 
group changed policies, often going through dramatic U-turns: for example, 
Denmark in the fall of  1982; France in March 1983; and Italy at the time of 
1. These initiatives never managed to extend the area of  exchange rate stability beyond the 
group of  small countries whose economies are  closely linked to the German economy. For a 
reconstruction of that experience, see Tnffin (1979) and European Economy (no. 12 [July 19821). 
2. Quote taken from a 1964 statement of the German Council of Economic Experts, reported in 
Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989, 23). 
3. When the Snake was set up in spring 1972, ten countries participated: Germany, the Nether- 
lands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, France, Italy, Great Britain, and Ireland. Den- 
mark, Ireland, and Great Britain pulled out in June 1972, but Denmark rejoined in December 
1972. Italy pulled out and Sweden joined in February  1973. France and Sweden left in January 
1974 and August 1977, respectively. The EMS began operation in March 1979. 549  Attitudes toward Inflation and the Viability of Fixed Exchange Rates 
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Fig. 12.1 
Source: OECD, main economic indicators. 
Annual consumer price inflation rate, relative to Germany 
the 1984 referendum on the “scala mobile.” With the gradual convergence of 
inflation, realignments became less necessary and  less frequent, until they 
were de facto abandoned in  1987.4 In  the meantime,  two more countries 
(Spain and the United Kingdom) joined the system, while Austria and Swe- 
den-which  are prevented from formal membership because they are not part 
of the European Community-follow  an exchange rate policy consistent with 
full membership. By  1991, European monetary authorities-even  the same 
central bank that in  1979 seemed to justify an inflation rate that was rising 
above 20 percent-are  unanimously ready to sign on to a European system of 
central banks whose statutes declare price stability as the main objective of 
monetary policy. 
4.  Fordiscussions of the EMS experience prior to 1987, see Collins (1988) and Rogoff (1985a). 550  Susan M.  Collins and Francesco Giavazzi 
The aim of this paper is to provide new evidence about the hypothesis that 
the recent popularity of fixed exchange rates in Europe results from a conver- 
gence in attitudes toward inflation. So far, research on the European disinfla- 
tion of the 1980s has concentrated on the extent to which membership in the 
EMS  affected expectations and thus the unemployment cost of  stabilizing 
prices (see, e.g., Giavazzi and Giovannini 1989; and Weber 1991). There has 
been less discussion of the reasons that led first to the decision to join the EMS 
and later (in most countries) to a change in policies that made the new  ex- 
change rate regime viable. Most existing work assumes that the turnaround 
was induced by “enlightened” policymakers whose unyielding commitment to 
price and exchange rate stability eventually produced a shift in private-sector 
expectations. An alternative view, explored in this paper, is that consumers’ 
perception of  the trade-off  between price and  output stabilization changed 
first. Note  that the second view raises an additional issue. Why did some 
countries pursue disinflation independently while others, by joining the EMS, 
seem to have attempted to replace their domestic central bankers with  the 
Bundesbank? This issue is also discussed briefly. 
The paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  12.1 compares the  Bretton 
Woods and the EMS experiences with inflation differentials and exchange rate 
adjustments. Section 12.2 discusses both the empirical methodology and the 
survey data of  consumer expectations about the future economic performance 
on which the analysis is based. Section 12.3 presents empirical evidence for 
the hypothesis that attitudes toward inflation and unemployment have shifted 
within Europe. Section 12.4 develops a theoretical framework that illustrates 
how changes in private-sector attitudes across countries might lead to a con- 
vergence in inflation rates. The model, which follows recent work by Alesina 
and Grilli (1991), provides a useful context for thinking about our empirical 
findings. Finally, section 12.5 contains our concluding discussion. 
12.1  Bretton Woods in Light of the EMS 
As documented in figure 12.lb, there have been two distinct phases in the 
EMS in terms of  the inflation experience of  its members. For the first few 
years, membership in the exchange rate mechanism did not seem to have any 
effect on the high-inflation countries. The year after the system was inaugu- 
rated, the inflation differential relative to Germany increased in France, Ire- 
land, and Italy. Convergence began only after 1982. This visual evidence is 
confirmed by  empirical research on the effects of  EMS membership. One 
common finding is that, to the extent that membership did affect expectations, 
the shift in expectations occurred with a lag: around 1983 in France, 1982 in 
Ireland and Denmark,  and late  1984 in Italy (see Giavazzi and Giovannini 
1989, chap. 5; and Webber 1991). 
During this first stage of  four to five years, the EMS had to accommodate 
countries with apparently very different attitudes toward inflation. In Italy, for 551  Attitudes toward Inflation and the Viability of  Fixed Exchange Rates 
example, the inflation differential with Germany remained above 10 percent 
until 1984. Thus, the success of the system in its early years must be attributed 
in large part to its flexibility: that is, to the smooth working of realignments. 
Revisions of central parities happened frequently and were never delayed long 
enough to allow the buildup of large misalignments. However, they also re- 
quired the agreement of all parties in the system, thus avoiding the risk of 
competitive devaluations  .5 Moreover, capital controls allowed devaluations to 
occur without financial disruptions and allowed central banks to choose the 
timing of realignments, instead of being forced to realign by  speculative at- 
tacks on reserves. 
In the latter half of  the 1980s, when European inflation rates and-more 
important, as we shall argue in this paper-European  attitudes toward infla- 
tion converged, frequent realignments became unnecessary. Eventually, intra- 
EMS exchange rates became fixed. (There has been  no change in  central 
parities since January  1987.) As financial markets came to understand that 
realignments were no longer necessary, the need for capital controls also van- 
ished. It therefore became possible to lift all administrative controls on intra- 
European financial transactions. 
Despite some similarities, the EMS experience contrasts sharply with the 
Bretton Woods experience. As for Germany-the  “center” in the EMS-U.S. 
inflation was lower than inflation in Europe, at least until the mid-1960s. On 
average, between 1960 and 1966, inflation (GDP deflators) was 2 percent per 
year lower in the United States than in France, 1.6 percent per year lower than 
in the United Kingdom, and 3 percent per year lower than in Italy. Even in 
Germany, inflation was higher than in the United States during this period, 
notwithstanding the German attempt to put downward pressure on domestic 
prices by revaluing the deutsche mark in 1961. Except for the deutsche mark 
episode, however, exchange rates remained fixed. When realignments hap- 
pened, they were dramatic events, forced by the unsustainable external posi- 
tion of a member country. The U.K. experience provides a clear example of 
the resultant difficulties. By  1966, the United Kingdom had accumulated a 
loss of competitiveness vis-2-vis the United States of almost 20 percent (mea- 
sured using unit labor costs). Sterling was devalued in November 1967, forced 
by  a speculative attack large enough to burst the dam provided by  British 
exchange controls (see Bordo, chap. 1 in this volume). 
Table 12.1 compares the inflation performance and the role of  exchange 
rates changes during Bretton Woods and the EMS. The first column of  the 
5.  A clear example is France in March 1983. Jacques Delors, then finance minister, went to the 
realignment meeting asking for a devaluation of the franc that was viewed as “excessive” by his 
colleagues. The meeting was suspended, Delors returned to  Paris, and the French government, 
facing exclusion from the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS, had to withdraw its request and 
change domestic policy accordingly. In  the end, the devaluation of the franc was  much smaller 
than the French had originally requested and was accompanied by devaluations of the Italian lira, 
the Belgian franc, and the Danish krone. 552  Susan M. Collins and Francesco Giavazzi 
’Igble 12.1  Inflation Differentials and Realignments:  Bretton Woods vs EMS 
Bretton Woods,  EMS, 
Cumulative Position  Cumulative Position 
Relative to the U.S.  Relative to Germany 
1960-66  1967-7  1  1979-87  1988-91 
Denmark: 
Unit labor cost 
Exchange rate 
Unit labor cost 
Exchange rate 
Unit labor cost 
Exchange rate 
Unit labor cost 
Exchange rate 
Unit labor cost 
Exchange rate 
Unit labor cost 
Exchange rate 
Unit labor cost 
Exchange rate 
United Kingdom: 
Unit labor cost 
Exchange rate 
Unit labor cost 
Exchange rate 
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Source:  OECD, national income accounts. Unit labor costs are constructed using the index of 
labor cost per  employee and the index of productivity. Both refer to the whole economy. 
Note:  The data for “unit labor cost” show the total change in the index of relative labor cost per 
unit of  output between each country and either the United States or Germany, over the period 
indicated.  “Exchange rate” is the total change in each country’s exchange rate relative to the 
dollar or the deutsche  mark over the  period indicated-a  positive sign indicates a cumulated 
depreciation. 
table confirms that, until the mid-l960s, Bretton Woods central parities were 
rarely changed: our sample of countries reports only the 1961 deutsche mark 
revaluation. In the late 1960s, realignments became more frequent. However, 
there was no convergence of inflation rates. Instead, as U.S. inflation accel- 
erated, the relative trend of unit labor costs reversed. 553  Attitudes toward Inflation and the Viability of  Fixed Exchange Rates 
The third and fourth columns of  12.1 offer a comparison with the EMS. 
During the early 1980s, when inflation differentials relative to Germany were 
large, realignments avoided the buildup of  large misalignments. Denmark 
provides a clear example of the difference. Between 1961 and 1966, the krone 
appreciated by  35.7 percent relative to the dollar, in real terms. Eventually, 
this was corrected in part when Denmark joined the sterling devaluation of 
1967. A similar inflation divergence relative to Germany between 1979 and 
1987, however, was accommodated by frequent devaluations, thus avoiding a 
significant real appreciation. Finally, the last column shows that, in the late 
1980s, the move toward more fixed exchange rates was accompanied by  a 
sharp convergence in inflation. 
Thus, as seen from the perspective of the EMS experience, Bretton Woods 
failed on two accounts. First, the system lacked the necessary flexibility to 
accommodate countries with different inflation rates. Second, although this is 
not a fault that can be ascribed to the design of the system, the Bretton Woods 
years did not see the convergence of attitudes toward inflation that character- 
ized Europe in the late 1980s and that we believe is a necessary condition for 
the survival of a fixed rate regime. 
In the remainder of  this paper, we first examine some new evidence that 
supports our view  about the convergence of attitudes toward inflation. We 
then offer a theoretical framework that highlights the links between attitudes 
and the choice of an exchange rate regime. 
12.2  Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis examines two issues. First, is there any evidence of 
shifts in attitudes toward inflation versus unemployment within EMS member 
countries? Second, if  so, when did any such shifts occur? In particular, we 
ask if there is any evidence of increased concern about inflation among coun- 
tries that gave up some monetary sovereignty in following Germany’s leader- 
ship of the multiple peg system. (Note that simply joining the EMS in  1979 
need not have entailed any such change.) We  would also like to know when 
any such shifts occurred. For example, if attitudes did change, did this occur 
before or after the EMS was instituted? Did it occur before or after changes in 
actual inflationary policy and performance that some countries experienced? 
We  assume that residents in each country have an expected loss function 
that depends on expectations about future inflation and unemployment. We 
use survey data from European households to provide information about how 
inflation and unemployment affect their assessments of general economic con- 
ditions, where the latter is interpreted as a measure of their “expected loss.” 
We  then use regression analysis to infer the implied weights on inflation and 
unemployment in this loss function and to look for changes in these weights 
over time. Following a description of  the data and methodology in this sec- 
tion, the empirical results are presented and discussed in section 12.3. 554  Susan M. Collins and Francesco Giavazzi 
12.2.1  The Data 
To  examine these issues, we use survey data on expectations about future 
economic performance from the European Community’s survey of consumer 
opinion, reported in European Economy, supplements B and C.6  Surveys of 
households are taken three times a year (January, May, and October) in each 
of eight countries. The complete sample is available since 1974.’ These data 
can be interpreted as information about the average household in each country. 
Three of the survey questions are relevant for our purposes. The first asks 
respondents their perceptions of prospects for the general economic situation 
in their country over the next twelve months, relative to the current situation 
in their own country. The second asks their expectations about the changes in 
the trend of the price level (inflation) over the next twelve months, and the 
third asks their expectations about changes in the unemployment rate over the 
next twelve months.* Responses for these two questions are also relative to 
the current situation in the respondent’s country. The published indicators are 
weighted  sums of  these responses. Each series ranges between -  100 and 
+ 100, but the scale differs across questions. In particular, if respondents, on 
average, expected the inflation rate, the unemployment rate, and general eco- 
nomic conditions all to be the same over the next twelve months as they had 
been recently, then the indicators would be 50, 0, and 0 respectively (see n. 8 
above). 
Table 12.2 shows the means and standard deviations of  each variable for the 
eight members of  the European Community. Looking first at general eco- 
nomic prospects (EP), the table shows that,  on average, respondents were 
pessimistic. The average response is less than zero for all eight countries, 
implying that, on average, economic conditions were expected to deteriorate. 
France, Belgium, and Ireland appear to be the most pessimistic, with Ger- 
6. We look at the nine countries that were members of the European Community during the 
1970s, with the exception of Luxembourg, for which these data are not available. In some cases, 
the reported figures average across months. We obtained the actual figure for the relevant months 
from the European Commission. However, these data were in each case identical to the published 
figures. 
7. The survey is given to a random sample of twenty-five hundred adults, most of whom are 
household heads, in each country  in January and May and to five thousand adults in October. 
(Note that we do not treat the October observations differently in the empirical analysis.) For 
additional discussion of the survey, see Papadia and Basano (1981). 
8. The three questions and possible responses are as follows: (1) “General economic situation 
in your country, prospects over the next twelve months?” The possible responses are “a lot better” 
(coded as  + I), “a little better” (+  %),  “the same” (0).  “a little worse” (- Y2),  “a lot worse” 
( -  l), or “don’t know.” (2) “Price trends over the next twelve months?” The possible answers are 
“more rapid increase” ( + l), “same increase” (+  %),  “slower increase” (0), “stability” (- %), 
“fall slightly” ( -  I), or “don’t know.” (3) “Unemployment level in your country in the next twelve 
months?” The possible responses are “increase sharply” ( + l),  “increase slightly” ( + %), “remain 
the same” (0), “fall slightly” (- %), “fall sharply” (- l), or “don’t know.”  For each variable, the 
“don’t know” responses are redistributed between the other answer categories according to the 
latter’s percentage distribution. 555  Attitudes toward Inflation and the Viability of  Fixed Exchange Rates 
Table 12.2  Means and Standard Deviations: Household Expectations 
General  Expected  Expected 
Economic  Price  Unemployment 
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Source: European Economy, Supplements B and C, various issues, May 1974-May  1990. 
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
‘January 1975-May  1990. 
many and the United Kingdom the least pessimistic. But recall that respon- 
dents in each country are asked about their expectations relative to recent per- 
formance in their own country. Therefore, responses for different countries 
are not on comparable scales. Cross-country comparisons must be interpreted 
with caution. 
Turning next to expected price changes (PT),  table 12.2 shows that Italians 
on average expected inflation rates to be about the same as in the past. (The 
mean response is close to 50.) Respondents in other countries expected infla- 
tion to slow somewhat (responses between 0 and 50),  with the greatest slow- 
down in inflation expected in Denmark. Italy and Belgium-not  Germany- 
are the countries with the least variation in expectations about price trends. 
Finally, table 12.2 shows that all countries, on average, expected unemploy- 
ment to rise. Italians expected the largest increase in unemployment, on aver- 
age, and Germany the smallest. 
12.2.2  Empirical Methodology 
We  interpret expected economic prospects as a measure of (minus) the ex- 
pected loss function for residents in each country. We  also assume that ex- 
pected general economic conditions are a function of expected inflation (price 
trends) and expected unemployment: the greater the expected price increases 556  Susan M. Collins and Francesco Giavazzi 
and the expected unemployment, the worse anticipated general economic con- 
dition~:~ 
(1)  -3  = EP = F(PT’, UP), 
where EP  is expected general economic situation in country i, PP is expected 
price trends in country i, and UP  is expected unemployment in country i. 
Our next step is to take a linear approximation to the loss function F(.). 
This equation is used in the estimation. (Future work will consider other spec- 
ifications, such as a quadratic function.) The weights on PT and UT in deter- 
mining EP provide indicators about attitudes toward inflation and unemploy- 
ment. As discussed above, these survey responses are not directly comparable 
across countries. However, a decrease in a given country’s tolerance for un- 
employment relative to inflation should imply a fall in the weight (a smaller 
negative weight) on UT relative to PT in determining general economic pros- 
pects. Thus, changes in attitudes should imply structural shifts in equation 
(  l).l0 Note that we will estimate the actual weights that respondents placed on 
expected  unemployment  and  expected  price  trends,  not  just  the  relative 
weight they placed on unemployment in  the loss function (b in  the model 
presented in sec. 12.4 below). This relative weight can be constructed from a 
ratio of parameters. 
Suppose that we wished to examine whether a shift in attitudes occurred at 
a given date s.  We  could simply construct a dummy variable that was  zero 
before s and unity afterward, enter it interactively with PT and  UT, and test 
whether the coefficients on these interacted variables differ from zero, in the 
appropriate directions. However, we do not wish simply to test for a prespec- 
ified breakpoint; we  wish to look at when  any shifts in  attitudes occurred. 
These breakpoints need not occur in all countries and need not occur at the 
same time for each country that experienced shifts. To look for the timing of 
any structural shifts, we estimated a series of  equations for each country, al- 
lowing the breakpoint to range from January 1976 to May  1989.” Thus, we 
estimated the following equation for each country: 
9. Ideally, we would analyze survey resonses to questions about whether inflation or unemploy- 
ment is considered a more serious problem. Such data are available for the United States and have 
been  studied by Fischer and Huizinga (1982). However, these data are not available, in a time 
series, for European countries. 
10. It is important to point out that there are alternative interpretations for changes in the coef- 
ficients in (2) below. One other possibility is that “general economic prospects” is really an indi- 
cator of expectations about future economic growth instead of an indicator of expected welfare. If 
so, changes in respondents’ perceptions about the structural relations among inflation, unemploy- 
ment, and growth would cause the coefficients to change. In general, it is very difficult to distin- 
guish between these two interpretations. 
11. This formulation  assumes that any possible change in attitudes occurred all at once. It 
would also be interesting to look for gradual changes in attitudes, e.g., using a specification that 
allows for time-varying parameters. 557  Attitudes toward Inflation and the Viability of  Fixed Exchange Rates 
where D  =  1 after the breakpoint, 0 otherwise. In  most cases, there was 
evidence of  serial correlation. Our estimations correct for first-order autore- 
gressive error terms. 
We  compare the values of the likelihood function across possible dates for 
a breakpoint to see which specification best fits the data. A convenient indi- 
cator for these comparisons is the posterior odds ratio, PR(S), for each possible 
breakpoint s. This ratio can be interpreted as the likelihood that the breakpoint 
occurred at time s relative to the likelihood that it occurred at s*, where s*  is 
the breakpoint at which the value of the likelihood function is maximized.” 
PR(S) is equal to one for s = s*  and is bounded between zero and one for all 
other dates, s. The ratio is useful for two reasons. First, it provides some 
information about how well the data can distinguish between alternative dates 
for the breakpoint. (For example, values close to one for many dates would 
suggest that it is difficult to pinpoint when the break occurred. Values close to 
zero at most dates, with a spike at one date, would suggest a clearly identifi- 
able breakpoint. Multiple spikes would suggest more than one shift in atti- 
tudes within the sample period.) Second, since the ratio always ranges from 
zero to one, it facilitates cross-country comparison of the degree of confidence 
about the timing of shifts in attitudes about inflation and unemployment. For 
each country, we show a plot of the values of the posterior odds ratio across 
breakpoints and report the maximum likelihood parameter estimates and di- 
agnostic statistics at breakpoint(s) corresponding to peaks in the value of the 
likelihood function. 
Estimates for C,, C,,  and C,  provide information about shifts in attitudes. 
A negative (positive) estimate for C,  can be  interpreted as increased pessi- 
mism about overall economic prospects, given expectations about inflation 
and unemployment. Negative estimates for C,  and C,  can be interpreted as 
increases in the weights that respondents placed on expected unemployment 
and  on expected inflation, respectively. And  (C, + C,)/(C,  + C,)  > C,/C, 
can be interpreted as a decrease in the relative weight placed on unemploy- 
ment expectations or as an indication that respondents have become willing to 
tolerate more unemployment in return for lower inflations. 
12. The strong serial correlation suggests that there may be omitted variables in our equations 
to explain expectations about next year’s economic conditions. We tried including actual levels of 
inflation and unemployment for each country and an  index of real oil prices. However, this did not 
significantly reduce the serial correlation problem.  Note that including these variables did not 
qualitatively change the results discussed in the text. 
13.  The  posterior  odds  ratio  for  a  breakpoint  at  date  s  is  defined  as  PR(S)  =  exp 
[LF(S) -  LF(s*)],  where LF(S) is the value of the log likelihood function, given a breakpoint at 
date s, and  LF(S*)  is the value of the log likelihood function at the breakpoint s*, where it is 
maximized. Thus, PR(S*)  =  1. Our procedure is similar to the one followed by Mankiw, Miron, 
and Weil(l987). 
14. While we discuss changes in the estimated 6-weight  on unemployment relative to infla- 
tion-the  estimated change in this ratio was statistically significant only in the cases of  Belgium 
and Ireland. 558  Susan M. Collins and Francesco Giavazzi 
12.3  Estimation Results 
Is there any evidence of  a shift in attitudes about inflation among EMS 
member countries? If  so, when did it occur, and in which direction was the 
change? This section discusses the results from our empirical analysis for each 
country. A summary and interpretation of  these results is given at the end of 
the section. 
12.3.1  France 
Figure  12.2~  shows the values of  the posterior odds ratios for alternative 
breakpoints for France. It shows that the likelihood function reaches a maxi- 
mum when the breakpoint is October 1979. This suggests that there was a 
change in attitudes during the first year the EMS was in operation-not  before 
it was instituted. There are also smaller peaks in the early 1980s. (The value 
of  PR[S  = May 19831 = .43, which can be interpreted as the likelihood that 
a shift occurred in May 1983 relative to the likelihood that it occurred in Oc- 
tober 1979 is 43 percent. Similarly, PR[S  = October 19861 = S3.)  This sug- 
gests that there were additional shifts in attitudes during the early years of the 
exchange rate system. This result is quite interesting, in light of the fact that 
it was not until after 1983 that French monetary policy and inflation perform- 
ance began to converge to policy and performance in Germany. 
The first two columns of  table 12.3 show parameter estimates for France 
assuming an October  1979 breakpoint. The equations fit quite well. They 
show that, on average in the 1970s, French respondents put about three times 
the weight on expected unemployment that they placed on expected inflation 
in forming their assessments of general economic prospects. (C,/C,  is about 
three.) The first column shows that, after October 1979, there is weak evi- 
dence that  respondents became  more  pessimistic about  general economic 
prospects (C, < 0) and  that  the weight  they  placed on price expectations 
increased (C, < 0). However, neither of  these estimates is statistically sig- 
nificant. 
It is possible that there are not enough data to distinguish between a change 
in attitudes toward inflation and an increase in pessimism more generally. In 
the second column, the latter change is ruled out (C, is constrained to equal 
zero). These estimates do show a statistically significant increase in the weight 
on inflation. They suggest that the weight on inflation relative to the weight 
on unemployment rose somewhat, from 0.28 before October 1979 to 0.39 
afterward. Of  course,  this result raises the question of  why French  voters 
elected FranGois Mitterand, and his very expansionary platform, in 1981. 
The third column of table 12.3 provides estimates assuming a breakpoint in 
May 1983. Here, C,  is significantly negative, suggesting that French respon- 
dents did anticipate less positive economic conditions in  general as French 
macroeconomic policies under Mitterand became more restrictive. These re- 
sults suggest that, before May  1983, the relative weight on unemployment 559  Attitudes toward Inflation and the Viability of Fixed Exchange Rates 
was 2.2 and provide weak evidence of  a decrease after May  1983 to  1.4. 
These findings are consistent with the view that French households’ concerns 
about inflation increased gradually during 1982-83. 
12.3.2  Italy 
Figure 12.26 shows the values of  the posterior odds ratios for Italy across 
alternative breakpoints. Here, there is a clear, single spike of the likelihood 
function in October 1978. Interestingly, this is a few months before the EMS 
began operation. There is little evidence of additional shifts later on. 
The last column of table 12.3 shows parameter estimates assuming an Oc- 
tober 1978 breakpoint. Again, the overall fit of the equation is quite good. In 
contrast to respondents in France, Italian respondents became more optimistic 
on average about general economic performance during the EMS period. Like 
French respondents, Italians appear to have become less willing to tolerate 
inflation after October 1978. The weight on price trends rises, and the shift is 
statistically significant-even  allowing for a change in the constant term. The 
weight on unemployment relative to inflation declined from 0.7 to 0.5 after 
the breakpoint. 
12.3.3  Germany 
Figure 12.2.c plots the posterior odds ratio across alternative breakpoints 
for Germany. It shows that the likelihood function peaks for breakpoints dur- 
ing October 19884ctober 1989. It also gives some evidence that attitudes 
were shifting in 1984-86.  However, there are only six observations from Oc- 
tober 1988 to the end of our sample, providing little information about such a 
recent shift in attitudes. We  also wished to allow for a possible shift in atti- 
tudes following the collapse of the Berlin Wall in late 1989. Thus, in addition 
to looking at parameter estimates for breakpoints in October 1988 and January 
1986, we also allow the coefficient on price trends to shift in October 1989, 
together with a general shift in attitudes in January 1986. 
Table 12.4 presents the three sets of estimates. Those for an October 1988 
breakpoint are in column  1. They point  to results that we  did not expect. 
German respondents’ tolerance for inflation relative to unemployment appears 
to have increased sharply. Respondents also appear to have become more pes- 
simistic about general economic prospects at the end of the 1980s. However, 
these results are somewhat strange in two respects. First, they suggest that 
Germany did not care at all about price trends after October 1988 (C, + C,  is 
close to zero). Second, they suggest that, as German respondents expected 
unemployment to increase, they became more sanguine about general eco- 
nomic prospects (C, + C, > 0). Both may be an artifact of  assuming that 
only one shift in attitudes occurred during the sample. 
The second and third columns of table 12.4 assume an earlier breakpoint- 
January 1986. In the middle column, we allow for only one shift, while, in 
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Table 12.3  Estimation Results: France and  Italy 
EP = C,  + C;  UT  + C;PT  + D{C, + C;  UT  + C;F’T} 
France 
Italy, 
Breakpoint  Oct. 1979  Oct. 1979  May 1983  Oct. 1978 
co  6.334  3.255  8.406  25.678 
(1.376)  (1.388)  (2.132)  (3.345) 
c,  -  ,563  -  ,532  -  ,600  -  ,434 
(7.256)  (-7.759)  ( -  8.738)  (-4.731) 
c2  -  ,196  -  ,148  -  ,270  -  ,656 
(-2.015)  ( -  1.969)  (-3.324)  (-4.333) 
c3  -4.213  ...  -9.680  35.208 
c4  .041  -  .010  ,146  -  ,083 
(-,781)  (- 1.795)  (3.79 1) 
(  .404)  ( -  ,124)  (1.379)  (- ,621) 
c5  -.118  -  ,172  -  ,049  -  ,364 
(- 1.040)  (-1.955)  (- ,421)  (- 1.922) 
Rho  .511  .485  ,623  ,449 
(4.015)  (3.765)  (5.403)  (3.325) 
In  L  -  129.90  -  130.23  -  130.736  -  129.027 
R2a  .814  ,800  ,765  ,856 
No. of obs.  49  49  49  49 
C,‘C2  2.9  3.6  2.2  .7 
(C,  + C,)/(C,  + C,)  1.9  2.6  1.4  .5 
Nore: The table shows maximum likelihood estimates, correcting for the first-order autocorrela- 
tion. “Rho” is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. The sample is from May  1974 to May 
1990. &statistics are given in parentheses. D  is a dummy equal to zero before the breakpoint and 
one from then on. 
’Based on transformed data, using autocorrelation coefficient, rho. 
are allowed to shift again in October 1989 in response to developments in the 
former East Germany. We  focus on the latter, which suggests three conclu- 
sions. First, German respondents do appear to have become more pessimistic, 
on average, about their economy in the mid-1980s. Second, the weight that 
Germans placed on expected price trends declined significantly in  the mid- 
1980s. In fact, C,  + C,  is close to zero. (There was no change in their weight 
on unemployment.) Increased German tolerance of inflation may help resolve 
the puzzle of why Germany has been willing to stay in an EMS that leads to 
higher German inflation. Finally, there appears to have been a further reduc- 
tion in the weight that German respondents placed on price movements after 
October 1989. This is consistent with West Germans expecting German uni- 
fication to increase inflation but, at the same time, feeling more positive about 
the likely performance of their economy. Unfortunately, there are too few ob- 
servations after October 1989 to distinguish between a general shift in opti- 
mism and a shift in attitudes toward inflation. 563  Attitudes toward Inflation and the Viability of Fixed Exchange Rates 
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(-11.760) 
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-  130.848 
,872 
49 
-  ,367 
1.59 
16.1 
Nore: The table shows maximum likelihood estimates, correcting for first-order autocorrelation. 
“Rho” is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. The sample is from May  1974 to May  1990. 
r-statistics are given in parentheses. D  is a dummy equal to zero before the breakpoint and one 
from then on. D,  is a dummy equal to zero before October 1989 and one from then on. 
‘Based on transformed data, using autocorrelation  coefficient, rho. 
12.3.4  Belgium and the Netherlands 
These two countries did not pull out of  the Snake in the 1970s (see n.  3 
above) but chose to follow German leadership. They also resemble Germany 
here in that parameter estimates in each imply a rise in relative tolerance for 
inflation. Looking first at Belgium, the plot of the posterior odds ratio in figure 
12.U  shows an initial peak in January 1981, with some evidence that attitudes 
had been shifting during the previous two years, and then a much larger peak 
in October 1985. The parameter estimates presented in table 12.5 show a sig- 
nificant increase in the weight on expected unemployment after January 198 1. 
After October 1985, there is evidence that the weight on inflation declined 
(the point estimate is close to zero). 
Turning next to the Netherlands, figure 12.2e shows that there appear to be 
a number of candidates for a breakpoint. In fact, all show attitudes shifting in 564  Susan M. Collins and Francesco Giavazzi 
Table 12.5  Estimation Results: Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland 
EP = C, + C, . LIT  + C, . PT + D{C,  + C, .  UT  + C, . PT} 
Be  1  g  i  u  m  The Netherlands 
Jan.  Oct.  Oct.  May  Ireland, 




-  ,489 
( -  8.462) 
-  ,391 
13.612 
(2.398) 
-  ,349 
(-4.212) 
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(-2.606) 
-  ,762 
( -  1.663) 
-29.265 
(1.426) 











21.381  21.613 
(3.855)  (6.694) 
-  .536  -  ,608 
(-8.181)  (-15.235) 
-  ,417  -  .616 
(-3.105)  (10.564) 
-  16.931  ,656 
-  ,071  -  ,275 
( -  ,460)  (- ,074) 
(- 2.767)  (.112) 
,274  ,296 
(1.224)  (1.680) 
,639  ,109 
(5.554)  (  ,684) 
-  152.352  -  130.707 
.745  .926 
49  49 
1.29  .99 
3.44  2.76 
Nore: The table shows maximum likelihood estimates, correcting for first-order autocorrelation. 
“Rho” is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. The sample is from May  1974 to May  1990. 
[-statistics are given in parentheses, D  is a dummy equal to zero before the breakpoint and one 
from then on. 
”Based  on transformed data, using autocorrelation coefficient, rho. 
the same direction: increasing tolerance for inflation and/or decreasing toler- 
ance for unemployment, Table 12.5 shows estimation results assuming break- 
points in October 1977 and in May 1986. For the earlier breakpoint, none of 
the changes in coefficients are statistically significant. (Constraining the con- 
stant term to be the same across subperiods did not alter this result.) However, 
the estimates suggest that the weight that Dutch respondents placed on unem- 
ployment relative to inflation rose from 0.5 to 2.0. The estimates for the later 
breakpoint show a further shift, to a relative weight on unemployment of 5.0 
after May 1986. 
12.3.5  Ireland 
Ireland also seems to have experienced a decrease in tolerance for unem- 
ployment. The likelihood function exhibits a series of peaks from late 1982 
through 1986 (see fig. 12.2f). The last column of table 12.5 gives the param- 
eter estimates assuming that the breakpoint was January 1986. These show 565  Attitudes toward Inflation and the Viability of Fixed Exchange Rates 
that the weight on price trends declined in the second subperiod while the 
weight on unemployment rose. Both coefficient estimates differ significantly 
from their estimated values in the earlier subperiod. The weight that Irish re- 
spondents placed on unemployment relative to inflation rose from slightly less 
than 1.0 before January 1986 to 2.8 afterward. 
12.3.6  Denmark 
As shown in figure  12.2g, there appear to be two breakpoints for Den- 
mark-an  early one in 1976 and one a decade later. Table  12.6 presents pa- 
rameter estimates for each. The early breakpoint suggests that, in the mid- 
1970s, Danish respondents placed little weight on inflation in their general 
economic assessments-the  relative weight on unemployment was  1 1.1. This 
changed dramatically, as the relative weight on unemployment fell to just 0.5 
after May  1976. (However, we  have only a few observations in the earlier 
subperiod.) The second set of estimates, with a January 1986 breakpoint, is 
quite different. They point to a rise in Danish tolerance for inflation and a 
decline in tolerance for unemployment. (This shift resembles the ones dis- 
cussed above for Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ireland.) Perhaps 
the relatively low explanatory power of the regressions for Denmark is due to 
the assumption of a single shift in attitudes. 
Without additional information about the early 1970s, it is difficult to test 
for multiple breakpoints. Instead, we allow the coefficient on PT to change 
only in January 1976, assuming a general breakpoint in January 1986. These 
results are reported in the third column of table 12.6. They imply that, prior 
to  1976, Danish respondents placed about the same weight on inflation and 
unemployment. During 1976-86,  their concern about inflation increased sig- 
nificantly (C, < 0).  After 1986, they became significantly more pessimistic 
about their economy overall. There is also weak evidence that the relative 
weight placed on unemployment rose somewhat. 
12.3.7  United Kingdom 
Finally, we look at the United Kingdom, the only country in our sample that 
was not a member of the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. Figure 12.2h 
shows that the value of the likelihood function peaks for a breakpoint in May 
1987.15  Estimates for this shift date are given in the last column of table 12.6. 
These  estimates  suggest that  British respondents became  more  optimistic 
about their economy overall after 1987 but that there was a large and signifi- 
cant increase in their tolerance for unemployment relative to inflation. (The 
relative weight on unemployment falls from 1.2 before 1987 to 0.3 more re- 
cently.) 
15. Interestingly, the 1987 breakpoint coincides with the abandonment of the United Kingdom’s 
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Table 12.6  Estimation Results: Denmark and the United Kingdom 
EP = C,  + C, .  UT + C, .  PT + NC, + C,  .  UT + C, .  PT}  + 0,.  C,  .  PT 
Denmark 
Jan. 1986,  United 
Jan. 1976  Kingdom, 






-  .522 
(- 3.532) 
-  ,047 
(- .229) 
10.908 
(  1.3 13) 
.120 
(.722) 
-  ,731 
(- 3.022) 
,843 
(  10.990) 
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(2.861) 
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-  .733 
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-  ,379 
(-5.110) 
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(-2.537) 
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( -  6.576) 





(  ,544) 
-  1.059 
( -  2.762) 
... 
,134 
(.  844) 





Note; The table shows maximum likelihood estimates, correcting for first-order autocorrelation. 
“Rho” is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. The sample is from May 1974 to May  1990. 
&statistics are given in parentheses. D  is a dummy equal to zero before the breakpoint and one 
from then on. D,  is a dummy variable equal to one before 1976 and zero from then on. 
’Based on transformed data, using autocorrelation coefficient, rho. 
12.3.8  Summary and Discussion 
These empirical results provide surprisingly strong support for the hypoth- 
eses advanced at the beginning of this paper. Shifts in attitudes about unem- 
ployment relative to inflation can help explain the “success” of  the EMS- 
increased convergence of  monetary policies  and  inflationary performance 
among members. To summarize, Italians became more tolerant of unemploy- 
ment relative to inflation shortly before the EMS came into operation. Unem- 
ployment tolerance also increased in  France, but the shift appears to have 
begun somewhat later, with most of the change occurring after the EMS was 
already in operation. (In both countries, the shift comes after the failure of the 
Snake.) In contrast-and  surprisingly-Germany  seems to have experienced 
a rise in relative tolerance for inflation in the mid-l980s, in the sense that 567  Attitudes toward Inflation and the Viability of Fixed Exchange Rates 
expected inflation became a less important determinant of overall assessments 
of the future economic situation. This was reinforced at the end of the decade, 
perhaps by German unification. Belgium and the Netherlands-both  mem- 
bers of the Snake and perhaps “closer” to Germany-as  well as Ireland seem 
to have had a similar rise in their tolerance for inflation. However, their shifts 
appear to have occurred earlier than the shifts in Germany. Denmark experi- 
enced both a decline in tolerance for inflation in the mid-1970s and a subse- 
quent reversal in the mid-1980s. Last but not least, the United Kingdom has 
experienced a fall in tolerance for inflation at the end of the 1980s, consistent 
with its late entry into the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. 
12.4  Attitudes toward Inflation and the Choice of an 
Optimal Central Banker 
The previous section has presented evidence of  shifts in attitudes toward 
inflation and unemployment in Europe since the late  1970s. In  particular, 
there appears to have been some convergence in attitudes, in the sense that 
initially high-inflation countries (such as France and Italy) have become less 
tolerant of  inflation relative to  unemployment while  attitudes in  tradition- 
ally low-inflation countries (such as Germany) have shifted in the opposite 
direction. 
This section develops a theoretical framework to illustrate how such shifts 
in private-sector attitudes might make fixed exchange rates more likely. The 
model is based on the new theories of economic policy that suggest that soci- 
eties concerned about the stability of  both prices and output may solve the 
dilemma between the lack of credibility of an “activist” central banker and 
the cost of giving up monetary policy as a stabilization tool by delegating the 
conduct of  monetary policy to an independent central banker whose prefer- 
ences for output and price stability are slightly more “conservative” than so- 
ciety’s.  l6 
More specifically, we follow recent work by Alesina and Grilli (1991) that 
assumes that citizens elect central bankers by majority rule. They have shown 
that, if citizens were to vote on which type of central banker to appoint, they 
would choose one who values price stability more than the median voter.’’ 
Next we  study the consequences of  a shift in consumers’ attitudes toward 
inflation. We  ask the following question. Assume that, after the shift in pref- 
erences, the first-best outcome (the election of a new central banker) is ruled 
out. Then there are two options: (1) keep the current central banker, who is no 
longer optimal since tastes have changed, or (2) force the domestic central 
16. For an early statement of this view, see Rogoff (1985b). Empirical evidence can be.  found 
in Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991). 
17. The original work by Rogoff (1985b) was not cast in the framework of  a voting equilibrium: 
he simply showed that society’s welfare can be improved by appointing a central banker whose 
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banker to relinquish domestic monetary sovereignty, for example, through a 
commitment to peg the exchange rate. 
12.4.1 
The starting point is the time-consistency problem illustrated by Kydland 
and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978). Following Barro and Gordon (1983), 
we assume that the time-consistency problem arises from the central banker’s 
attempt to steer the economy toward higher output growth. The preferences of 
the central banker are described by the loss function: 
Voters’ Preferences and the Optimal Central Banker 
(3)  L  = E[p2  + b(x -  /c)~], 
where E(.) is the expectation operator, p  the inflation rate, and (x -  k) the 
deviation of the level of output from the central banker’s target k. The param- 
eter b measures the weight that the central banker attaches to output fluctua- 
tions, relative to fluctuations in the level of inflation. Output is determined by 
an expectational Phillips curve: 
(4)  x = (p -  Ep) + e, 
where the “natural” rate of output has been assumed to be equal to zero, the 
elasticity of output with respect to unexpected inflation has been assumed to 
be equal to one, and e is an i.i.d. real shock with mean zero and variance u:. 
Expectations  are  formed-and  wages  are  negotiated-before  the  central 
banker sets the inflation rate; the realization of the random shock e is known 
to the central banker when monetary policy is set but not to wage setters when 
contracts are signed. It is well known that, in this setup, the time-consistent 
levels of inflation and output are 
b 
1 + be’ 
Equations (5) and (6) illustrate the time-consistency problem. If  the central 
banker attempts to steer output away from the natural rate, the average rate of 
inflation is positive (its optimal level in [3] is zero), with no gains in terms of 
output stabilization. The trade-off between average inflation and the variance 
of output, u:  = $/(1  + b)Z,  depends on the value of  the parameter b. The 
lower is b in the central banker’s objective function, the lower is inflation (on 
average), but the higher is the variance of  output. If  b were equal to zero, 
(average) inflation would be eliminated, but monetary policy would loose any 
ability to stabilize output. 
Suppose now that voters were able to elect a central banker who, during her 
term of  office, could freely pursue her preferred monetary policy-that  is, 
once elected, the central banker cannot be recalled until the end of  her term. 
Voters differ with respect to the relative weight that they attach to inflation and 
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identical to (3) but with a relative weight  bi  on the two objectives. Under 
majority rule, the central banker elected will be the one preferred by the me- 
dian voter, that is, by the voter characterized by the median value of bi:  b,. 
As shown by  Alesina and Grilli (1991), the first-order condition that deter- 
mines the type of central banker chosen by the median voter is 
(7)  b*  *  k2 - [  a’  ] . (b,,, - b*) = 0. 
(1 + b*)’ 
The parameter b*,  which characterizes the preferences of  the “optimal” 
central banker from the viewpoint of  the median voter (and thus of the central 
banker who will be elected by majority rule), is a function of the preferences 
of the median voter, b,,  and of the variance of real shocks. Equation (7) shows 
that, for u:  >  0, b*  is always positive but smaller than b,:  as originally shown 
by  Rogoff  (1985b), the median voter has an incentive to appoint a central 
banker  who is  more  “conservative” than  she herself  is-that  is, a central 
banker who values fighting inflation more than the median voter does.’* 
12.4.2  The Choice to Relinquish Monetary Sovereignty 
Consider now the effects of a change in voters’ preferences. Let us assume 
that the distribution of preferences across voters shifts so as to result in a lower 
value of  b,:  the median voter becomes relatively more concerned about infla- 
tion.I9  As b,  falls, so does b*, according to equation (7).*O 
The obvious outcome of a change in voters’ preferences is that, at the end 
of the term of office, a new central banker is elected whose preferences reflect 
the change in voters’ concerns for output and price stability. For the purpose 
of our discussion, however, we are interested in studying the case when the 
first-best outcome (the election of  a new central banker) is ruled out. We con- 
sider two options: (a)  keep the current central banker, who is no longer opti- 
mal but cannot be removed, or (b) short-circuit the independence of  the do- 
mestic  central  banker  by  signing  an  international agreement that  implies 
relinquishing domestic monetary sovereignty, for example, a commitment to 
passively peg the exchange rate to a foreign currency, made credible by  a 
sufficiently high political cost of abandoning the peg. 
What are the costs and benefits of  option b? If  the shift in voters’ prefer- 
18. The “independence” of the central banker during her term of office is crucial to the result, 
as it amounts to a form of precommitment. If the central banker could be recalled before the end 
of her term, it would be impossible to improve on the time-consistent equilibrium corresponding 
to b = b,,  which, by the first-order condition (5), is inferior to the equilibrium corresponding to 
b  = b*. The length of  the central banker’s term of office is clearly crucial because, when a new 
one is elected, b*  can change. What is relevant, in the framework of this model, is that the length 
of office be at least as long as that of wage contracts. 
19. In our empirical work, we test for a change in consumers’ preferences assuming that the 
median and the average voter-the  only ones we can observe-coincide.  This obviously depends 
on the distribution of  preferences. 
20. It is straightforward to show, from (7). that the derivative of b*  with respect to b, is positive. 570  Susan M. Collins and Francesco Giavazzi 
ences reflects an increased concern for inflation, then replacing the domestic 
monetary authority (elected at a time when inflation was not perceived as such 
a serious problem) with  a foreign central banker more committed to price 
stability may be an attractive option. The cost is a higher variance of domestic 
output since the foreign central banker-to  the extent that she cares-will 
stabilize output in her own country. The correlation between domestic and 
foreign real shocks will thus be an important factor in the decision to relin- 
quish monetary sovereignty. 
The choice between options a and b is illustrated in figure 12.3. The param- 
eter b, shown on the horizontal axis, characterizes the preferences of the rele- 
vant central banker. On the vertical axis is the value of the median voter’s loss 
function: L(b, b,)  is the loss function under the “old” voter’s preferences (b,); 
it is minimized at b = b*(b,). A shift in preferences, from bm  to b,‘  < bm, 
implies that the “optimal” central banker will be relatively more concerned 
about inflation also (b* also falls along with b,).  The relevant comparison is 
between L[b*(b,), b,’]--point  A-and  the value of the loss function at some 
other point, say for b  = b,,  which corresponds to the relative weight that the 
foreign central banker attaches to price and output fluctuations (point B in the 
figure). 
We  shall first study the  simpler case where  bf = 0:  the foreign central 
banker is concerned only about price stability and gives no weight to fluctua- 
tions in output. This case is simpler because the covariance between domestic 
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and foreign real shocks is obviously irrelevant. We  shall then ask how  the 
incentive to relinquish monetary sovereignty is affected by the covariance of 
real shocks when the foreign central banker is also trying to stabilize (her 
own) level of output. 
Pegging to a Central Banker Solely Committed to Price Stability 
As we show in equation (A4) in the appendix, the choice between options 
a  and  b  can be  described by  figure  12.4. On  the horizontal axis appears 
b*(b,), which characterizes the preferences of  the central banker that were 
optimal before the shift in preferences. This is shown on the vertical axis: 
(b, - bm’),  The locus through the origin describes the points where the me- 
dian voter, following the shift in preferences, is indifferent between keeping 
the domestic central banker and deciding to short-circuit her independence by 
signing an international agreement that commits her to passively peg to her 
foreign counterpart. This will happen whenever the shift in preferences is suf- 
ficiently large, given how different the two central bankers available are: the 
domestic one, whose preferences are described by  b*(b,), and the foreign 
one, whose b equals zero. If  the concern for inflation was relatively high to 
start with (thus resulting in a relatively high value of b*), the shift must be 
large to convince the median voter to “adopt” a foreign central banker who 
(brn-brn’) 
b*(brn) 
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cares only about price stability. An increase in the variance of  domestic real 
shocks (that for given voters’ preferences raises b*) shifts the indifference 
locus upward: the shift in preferences must be larger to justify abandoning the 
home central banker, even if she is no longer optimal. 
The Correlation between Domestic and Foreign Real Shocks 
If the foreign central banker, like the domestic one, were chosen by major- 
ity rule, her concern for output stabilization would not be zero, as assumed 
above. We  show in the appendix that, if the correlation between domestic and 
foreign real shocks is small, the higher is bf (the parameter describing the 
preferences of the foreign central banker), the less likely is the median voter 
to decide to give up monetary sovereignty. This is true even if  b, happens to 
match the preferences of  the new  “optimal” central banker (from the view- 
point of the domestic voter), as long as the covariance of real shocks is small, 
because the home country imports a positive rate of  inflation that abroad is 
justified by  the gains in terms of  output stabilization but at home is just  a 
source of inefficiency. 
This has the following important implication: if  the correlation between 
domestic and foreign real shocks is zero, a foreign banker stubbornly commit- 
ted to price stability is preferable, even relative to one who happened to attach 
the “optimal” weight to price and output stabilization. 
As  the correlation between  domestic and  foreign real  shocks rises,  the 
home country starts benefiting from the stabilization independently carried 
out by the foreign central banker: for a given shift in preferences, the higher 
the correlation, the more likely it is that the median voter will choose to relin- 
quish monetary sovereignty. In terms of figure 12.4, an increase in the corre- 
lation between domestic and foreign real shocks shifts the locus downward, 
increasing the chances that the domestic central banker will be short-circuited. 
(A formal proof is provided in the appendix.) 
12.5  Concluding Remarks 
History has provided us with  a number of  examples of  multiple-country 
fixed exchange rate regimes that have eventually fallen apart. At the top of the 
list is the Bretton Woods system, which collapsed in 1971. Early attempts at 
a European exchange rate system also failed-notably,  the Snake that was 
formed in 1972 with ten members but had dwindled to only five small coun- 
tries pegging to Germany by 1979, when it was replaced by the EMS. 
In light of these failures, why has the EMS been so successful in reducing 
inflation differentials and stabilizing exchange rates among members and, in- 
deed, in expanding its membership? This paper has argued that a key factor in 
explaining these successes has been a convergence in attitudes toward infla- 
tion and unemployment in Europe since the late 1970s. In contrast, analysts 
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toward inflation, and in the resultant policy choices, from the late  1960s. 
However, the EMS was not initially viewed as a success. In  its early years 
(1979-82), there is little evidence that membership in its exchange rate mech- 
anism (EM)  forced countries to give up monetary sovereignty. France and 
Italy both followed quite expansionary monetary policies, in contrast to Ger- 
many.  Both experienced rising inflation and underwent a series of  large ex- 
change rate adjustments. Interestingly, other countries that did not participate 
in the ERM, such as the United Kingdom (and the United States), did signifi- 
cantly reduce their inflation rates during the early  1980s. However, since 
1982, there has been  widespread convergence of  policy  and  performance 
among ERM members, and membership has expanded to include Spain and 
the United Kingdom. 
This paper had two tasks. First, it presented some new empirical evidence 
to support the view that one important reason for the success of  fixed ex- 
change rates in the EMS has been a convergence of attitudes toward inflation 
and unemployment among EMS members. Second, it developed a theoretical 
framework to illustrate why shifts in attitudes of voters within a given country 
might lead that country to give up monetary sovereignty by  pegging its ex- 
change rate to a “leader.” 
The theoretical section of  the paper can be  summarized as follows. Con- 
sider a country that has inherited a central bank with a prespecified stance 
toward fighting inflation-that  is, preferences that were optimal given voters’ 
past preferences toward inflation and unemployment. Now  suppose that the 
median voter becomes more concerned about inflation. There are two possible 
outcomes. First, the country might engineer a change in  the anti-inflation 
stance of its own central bank. Whether this is possible depends on character- 
istics of the country in question, such as its political system, the timing of 
elections, and the freedom of its central bank from political suasion. The sec- 
ond, less preferable option its to tie the hands of the domestic central bank by 
committing to follow the monetary policy of a central bank that is more com- 
mitted to fighting inflation. The gain from giving up monetary sovereignty is 
lower inflation. The cost is a reduced ability to stabilize domestic output. The 
paper shows that whether the country will choose to become (and remain!) a 
follower depends on how much domestic preferences have  shifted, on how 
different  the  domestic  and  the  potential  leader’s  central  banks’  anti- 
inflationary stances are, and on the covariance between domestic output and 
the leader’s output. 
The empirical section of the paper uses household survey data to look for 
shifts in attitudes toward inflation and unemployment in eight European coun- 
tries during 1974-90.  For each country, we  regress expectations about the 
general economic situation on expectations about the behavior of inflation and 
unemployment and look for shifts in the structural coefficients. Our empirical 
results provide considerable  evidence of such shifts. 
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employment appears to have increased significantly in both Italy and France 
during our sample period. Both these countries had high inflation during the 
1970s and opted to pull out of the Snake. But both reduced their inflation rates 
and stabilized their exchange rates during the EMS period. Interestingly, we 
find that much of the change in attitudes occurred ufer the EMS was already 
in  operation-particularly  for France.  This could help explain why  these 
countries did not adopt more anti-inflationary policies until the mid- 1980s. 
Exchange rate realignments were not "politicized"  and thereby made costly 
until after 1982. Before this time, ERM membership arguably required little 
reduction in monetary sovereignty. Second, we also find that the United King- 
dom experienced an increase in concern about inflation in the late 1980s. Per- 
haps this shift in attitudes was a factor in the recent decision to join the ERM. 
The final result is a surprise that we find intriguing: a shift in the opposite 
direction for households in Germany. During the mid-l980s, they appear to 
have become less concerned about inflation. Interestingly, some of the small 
countries that stayed with Germany in the Snake-that  is, Belgium, the Neth- 
erlands, and Denmark-show  a similar shift. (Such a shift is also evident in 
Ireland, which is somewhat more puzzling.) This finding provides a possible 
explanation for why Germany might be willing to stay in an exchange regime 
that requires it to accept a higher inflation rate. 
Our analysis thus points to some key differences between Bretton Woods 
and the EMS that help explain why one system of  fixed exchange rates col- 
lapsed while the other has expanded. Consider first the Bretton Woods expe- 
rience. The early phase (1960-66)  saw large inflation differentials, relative to 
the center (the United States), which had relatively low inflation. However, it 
was difficult to adjust exchange rates, resulting in large real misalignments. In 
the second phase (1967-71),  exchange rate adjustments did occur, but there 
was no convergence in inflation rates. In fact, the differential reversed as U.S. 
inflation rose relative to inflation in most other members. 
The EMS experience is strikingly different. Although there were also large 
cumulative inflation differentials (with low-inflation Germany at the center) in 
the first phase (1979-87),  they were in large part offset by exchange rate re- 
alignments, and capital controls helped avoid disruptive speculative attacks. 
In the second phase (1987-91),  exchange rate adjustments stopped; however, 
this was sustainable because of the convergence in inflation rates. 
Thus, there are two important differences between the two systems. First, 
the  EMS  exchange rate  mechanism facilitated smooth adjustments of  ex- 
change rates in the period before inflation rates converged. Second, a conver- 
gence in attitudes toward inflation (and unemployment) appears to have oc- 
curred in Europe during the  1980s. This shift in attitudes facilitated-and 
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Appendix 
Relinquishing Monetary Sovereignty to a Foreign Central Banker 
Solely Committed to Price Stability 
We  first consider the case where the foreign central banker is solely com- 
mitted to price stability: that is, the relative weight that she assigns to output 
stabilization is b  = bf = 0. After a shift in the median voter’s preferences, 
from b, to bk, the choice between pegging and keeping the domestic (subop- 
timal) central banker depends on the difference between the expected values 
of the loss function at b = b*(b,,,) and b = b,  = 0: 
(‘41)  E{L[b*(b,),  -  E{L(O, bL1. 
Noting that for any given value of a central banker’s preferences, b, the ex- 
pected loss for a voter with preferences b,  is 
(A2)  E[L(b,  b,)]  = .5(b2 + b,)[k2 + u;/(l  + b)2], 
and using the median voter’s first-order condition, equation (7) in the text, it 
can be shown that (Al)  is equal to 
where b*  = b*(b,). (A3) is positive for 
b*(2  + b*) 
(b, - b;) > b*  +  b*(l + b*)3 [l +  1  (A4)  ]  (1 + b*)‘ 
=f(b*,  af). 
It can also be shown that both dfldb* and d2fld(b*)2 are positive, thus justifying 
the graph in figure 12.4. Moreover, dfldcr’  = (dfldb*)(db*/du2)  + dflda2 is 
also positive: an increase in the variance of  domestic real shocks shifts the 
indifference locus upward. 
The Covariance between Domestic and Foreign Real Shocks 
We  now assume that b, > 0, the parameter that characterizes the prefer- 
ences of the foreign central banker, is positive and smaller than b*(b,). In this 
case, the choice whether to relinquish monetary sovereignty depends on the 
sign of 
(A51  E{L[b*(b,),  bL1)  - E[Ubf, bL)l. 
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The term in the braces corresponds to expression (Al), whose sign depends 
on the sign of (A4); the term in brackets is equal to 
(A6)  -  bfrkj - (1 + b:) [b,/(l  + b,)]’  + 2 b;[b,/(l  + bf)]ud,, 
where k,  is the foreign output target,  uf  is the  variance  of  foreign  output 
shocks, and u#  is the covariance between the shocks to foreign and domestic 
output. If shocks are uncorrelated, a positive value of b,(motivated  by the fact 
that the foreign central banker cares about output fluctuations in his own coun- 
try) reduces the incentive to “adopt” the foreign central banker. As  we noted 
in the text, if the covariance were zero, a foreign central banker who happened 
to be the ideal one after the shift in preferences  would be worse than one 
stubbornly committed to price stability. The intuition requires remembering 
(from the first-order condition described in eq. [7] in the text) why the median 
voter would  choose a central banker  with a positive b,,  thus resulting  in a 
positive average inflation rate: only because a positive value of b,dampens  the 
variance of output. But if foreign output shocks are uncorrelated with domes- 
tic shocks, from the viewpoint of home residents a positive value of  b, is just 
a source of inefficiency; it keeps inflation positive with no effects on the vari- 
ance of domestic output. The third term in the expression shows instead that, 
the higher  the covariance between foreign and domestic output shocks, the 
higher the likelihood that “adopting” the foreign central banker may be a su- 
perior option. This is because the correlation between domestic and foreign 
shocks allows the home country to benefit  from the  stabilization  indepen- 
dently carried out abroad. 
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COIlUtlent  Michele Fratianni 
Although Susan Collins and Francesco Giavazzi’s paper does not deal directly 
with  the Bretton  Woods  system, its relevance  for this  conference’s theme 
comes from their assessment of the failure of  Bretton Woods and the implica- 
tions for the construction of a stable, fixed exchange rate area in Europe. The 
message is that  Bretton  Woods broke down because  it lacked flexibility in 
exchange rate adjustment and because the participating countries had different 
views  about the desirable rate of  inflation.  In contrast,  “common  attitudes 
toward inflation are a necessary condition for the viability of a fixed exchange 
rate system,” in particular the European Monetary System (EMS) and its evo- 
lution into a full-fledged monetary union. 
The conclusion of  the paper is that the successful  reduction of  inflation 
differentials in the EMS stems from “a convergence in attitudes toward infla- 
tion and unemployment in Europe since the late 1970s.” In turn, the source of 
this convergence is that voters in France and Italy became more “conserva- 
tive”  (i.e.,  more concerned about inflation)  in the 1980s, whereas voters in 
Germany became less “conservative.” 
While I agree that inflation convergence has taken place because of changes 
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in attitudes about the role of inflation,’ I would like to raise some methodolog- 
ical points about the way Collins and Giavazzi reach their conclusions and, at 
the end, suggest an alternative to the hypothesis of a shift in voter preferences: 
namely, a shift in central bank attitudes about the role of inflation in the econ- 
omy and the adoption of medium-term monetary targets aimed at reducing the 
rate of inflation. 
The Theoretical Construct 
My  first point  concerns the applicability of  the scenario motivating the 
model adopted by  Collins and Giavazzi (see Alesina and Grilli 1991). An 
election takes place, the outcome of  which is a shift to the “right”-that  is, 
more concerned with inflation-of  the median voter. The model assumes that 
the existing central banker, who has more liberal views on inflation than the 
median voter, cannot be dismissed because of central bank independence. The 
government faces two options. Either it keeps the old central banker and ac- 
cepts a higher inflation rate than the median voter desires, or it signs an inter- 
national agreement whereby the exchange rate is pegged to a currency of  a 
country that is credibly committed to a high degree of price stability. 
This scenario lacks plausibility for two reasons.  First,  in countries like 
France and Italy, the governor of  the central bank serves at the discretion of 
the government. Dismissing the governor carries for the government a lower 
cost than  signing and  sticking to the above-mentioned international agree- 
ment. Second, going back to the formation of  the EMS,  we  have two ex- 
amples-at  opposite ends of the inflation spectrum-of  governments signing 
the EMS  agreement that  do not  fit  the  motivation underlying the  model. 
The first is Germany, whose chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, short-circuited the 
Bundesbank, not  because of  undesirable inflation policies pursued  by  the 
bank, but because he wanted to use the EMS to achieve political union in 
Europe: “I had always regarded the EMS, not only as a mere instrument to 
harmonize the economic policies of the EC member countries, but also as part 
of  a  broader  strategy for  the  political  self-determination in  Europe. . . . 
France under Giscard was prepared for the loss of  sovereignty that would 
come at the end of this road; the Bundesbank and many of the German profes- 
sors of economics, who think of themselves as experts, were not prepared for 
it (and still are not today)” (Schmidt 1990). Italy, on the other hand, offers 
another type of illustration that is also hard to reconcile with Collins and Gia- 
vazzi’s argument. The Italian government entered the EMS to actually disci- 
pline itself, an objective that had eluded the Bank of Italy for a long time. The 
then governor of the bank, Paolo Baffi, wrote that “the participation of  our 
1. In fact, empirical evidence suggests that the change in attitudes in the early part of the 1980s 
is more important in explaining EMS convergence than the popular alternative of  German domi- 
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country in the EMS implies a commitment to reach in a short time a degree of 
monetary stability equivalent to the Community average of  which we are a 
part; beyond the exchange rate, this commitment includes public finances, 
productivity, wages, and prices” (Banca d’Italia 1979, 375). 
Household Survey Data and Empirical Testing 
My second point concerns the use of the European Community household 
survey data and the empirical procedure. Given the importance of the data for 
the strategy and conclusions that Collins and Giavazzi reach, a more thorough 
discussion of  what the surveys represent would have been useful. To  begin 
with, the question on price trends (PT) clearly refers to the expected change 
of the inflation rate and not the expected level of the inflation rate, whereas the 
questions on general economic conditions (EP)  and unemployment (UT)  refer 
to the expected level of the variables over the next twelve months. In contrast, 
the loss function (1) is written in terms of expected levels of EE PT, and UT. 
Furthermore, following Collins and Giavazzi’s assumption that EP expresses 
a utility level dependent on PT and UT, the responses to Ee  PT, and UT are 
linked by a rationality criterion. To  check this, I arbitrarily looked at the sur- 
vey data for France and Italy for the period 1974:  1-1983: 1 (there was a break 
in the series after 1983) to see whether the three responses were consistent in 
the sense that when respondents indicated that PT and UT would deteriorate 
EP would decline, or vice versa. I found that five out of fifty-four  observations 
violated this consistency requirement. Unless respondents are irrational, this 
finding suggests that at least one more variable is missing in the information 
set of individuals when expressing their sentiments about future values of EP 
or,  more generally, that the assumed preference function is not empirically 
valid. 
One obvious candidate for a missing variable is output growth. Changes in 
the unemployment rate are an imperfect proxy of output growth, and even 
more so in European countries where UT has remained relatively high, despite 
“decent” economic growth. Hysteresis effects, labor market rigidities, and 
laws that hamper labor mobility are some of  the reasons why changes in un- 
employment rates do not correlate well with output growth (Commission of 
the European Communities 1984; Lawrence and Schultze 1987). The omis- 
sion of a potentially important variable, such as output growth, from equation 
(2) creates the problem that the residual term in the equation captures move- 
ments of the omitted variable. Since UT and output growth are related, it fol- 
lows that UT is not independent of the error term, with the attendant econo- 
metric consequences. 
Finally, supposing for argument’s sake that the missing variable poses no 
problem in the sense that it is constant over time, how does one interpret the 
regression results of the paper? I believe that the estimated coefficients have 
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rates and changes in  inflation rates than with  welfare weights and that the 
variable EP has more to do with an overall index of combining different fore- 
casts than a welfare index. 
Some evidence in favor of this proposition comes from Papadia and Basano 
(1981), who looked at the properties of Pi?  They transformed the price trend 
survey data responses into quantitative values of the expected rate of inflation 
using a logistic (and linear) function. The transformed series behaves ration- 
ally in the (weak) sense that it can forecast the rate of inflation more accurately 
than purely autoregressive estimates of the inflation rate. I do not know of any 
comparable work on the unemployment rate. Yet,  on the basis of  this evi- 
dence, I submit an alternative explanation of the estimated values of  b-the 
relative weight on unemployment-in  the regressions. Households got better 
in forecasting inflation rates in the 1980s because the mean and variances were 
shifting downward in high-inflation France and Italy. In sum, the downward 
shift in the estimate of b for France and Italy could reflect improvements in 
forecasting PT relative to Ui? 
Peculiar Results 
While the empirical results for France and Italy accord with our intuition, 
those relating to Germany do not: the estimated b rises sharply for Germany 
after October 1988. This, by itself, is a stunning result in light of the history 
of the EMS since the last realignment of January 1987. France and, to a lesser 
extent, Italy have repeatedly complained about tight German monetary policy 
while at the same time preventing the deutsche mark from realigning upward. 
In contrast, the convergence of the b’s among the three countries should have 
spelled French and Italian acquiescence to German monetary policy. 
An Alternative Hypothesis 
As I mentioned earlier, there is something to the story of  a change in atti- 
tudes about inflation rates. Figure 12C.  1, showing annual percentage changes 
in the consumption price deflator for EMS countries and a group of non-EMS 
countries, suggests that such a change can be approximately dated at the end 
of  the  1970s. The failures of  active demand management of  the  1970s led 
policymakers of the industrial countries to gradually switch to medium-term 
monetary targeting aimed at reducing the rate of inflations2  Such a switch did 
not exclusively affect the EMS countries; the non-EMS countries were  af- 
fected as well.3 Indeed, the two lines are so close as to suggest that there is 
nothing unique about EMS countries’ inflation rates (Fratianni and von Hagen 
2. See Chouraqui and Price (1984). Quantitative monetary targets were adopted by Germany 
(1974), Italy (1974), Canada (1973, France (1977), Japan (1977), the United States (October 
1979), and the United Kingdom (March 1980). 
3. The data come from Fratianni and von Hagen (1992, chap. 2). Non-EMS countries consist 
of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Greece, Japan, Switzerland,  the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. The weights used in adding individual countries’ inflation rates are based on 1982 
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1992). Further corroborating evidence comes from figure 12C.2, showing the 
growth rates of  the aggregate EMS and non-EMS monetary base.4 Camen, 
Genberg, and Salemi (1991) apply an inverse control procedure to infer the 
4.  The countries and weights are the same as those for the inflation rate. 582  Susan M. Collins and Francesco Giavazzi 
objectives of the Bundesbank and the Banque de France and find that the latter 
gave a much larger weight to inflation after June 1982. Such a shift makes the 
French central bank behave more like the Bundesbank. 
In sum, my alternative to the Collins-Giavazzi hypothesis is that the disin- 
flation of  the 1980s was to a large extent the result of changes in attitudes of 
the monetary  authorities  toward  inflation.  Clearly,  this  alternative does not 
preclude the Collins-Giavazzi hypothesis of  the median voter becoming more 
conservative. While central bank preferences will ultimately have to converge 
with those of the electorate, I believe that the disinflation of the 1980s was the 
result of the central bankers leading the charge, with the public trailing right 
behind. 
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Comment  Niels Thygesen 
This paper by Susan Collins and Francesco Giavazzi is an original and intrigu- 
ing contribution to our efforts at understanding why the European Monetary 
System (EMS) has succeeded  where the Bretton Woods system failed. The 
EMS has moved through three stages of increasingly tight exchange-rate man- 
agement: (1) an initial stage for the first four years since the start in March 
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1979 during which the system looked like a crawling peg, although devalua- 
tions sometimes.did not fully offset excess inflation; (2) a disciplinary stage, 
lasting also nearly four years, as most non-German participants aimed to 
squeeze their inflation rates by  maintaining as stable exchange rates as pos- 
sible for their currencies against the deutsche mark; and (3) a third stage, now 
lasting for more than five years, during which rates have moved only within 
the fluctuation margins. 
This process of gradually increasing emphasis on nominal convergence is 
usually analyzed as the result of changing perceptions among policymakers as 
to the unemployment-inflation trade-off, combined with a shift in preferences 
toward a greater weight on the objective of price stability. Both authors have 
made important contributions to the literature on these explanations of why a 
number of member states of the European Community have chosen to modify 
their policies and why they have opted to do so through participation in the 
EMS. In the present joint paper, the authors advance the hypothesis that the 
shift in policy was preceded by a shift in voter preferences toward more aver- 
sion to inflation; in the absence of  an  opportunity to replace their domestic 
central bank leadership with a more “conservative” one to reflect this shift, 
voters have been content to see monetary sovereignty constrained by pegging 
to the deutsche mark. Furthermore, the authors devise an ingenious way of 
using survey data to evaluate empirically if, and when, changes in preferences 
can be identified. This empirical study is the most novel and commendable 
part of the paper. 
Since January 1974, the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs of the European Commission has published at intervals of four months 
the results of  a questionnaire study of household perceptions of recent trends 
in the economic performance of the respondents’ country and expectations as 
to the next twelve months. Two  specific questions are asked, namely, with 
respect to changes in the rate of  inflation and in the unemployment percent- 
age. Consumers are also asked to evaluate the general macroeconomic situa- 
tion of  their country. The questionnaire also asks three questions relating to 
the particular situation of  the individual respondents with respect to their fi- 
nancial situation, savings, and intended major purchases. The authors focus 
on the three first questions and assume that the responses to the general mac- 
roeconomic question can be seen as weighted averages of the responses to the 
two specific questions on inflation and unemployment. They discuss in a care- 
ful and well-documented way possible dates for one or more breakpoints in 
the weights of  the two macroeconomic indicators that add up to the general 
evaluation by consumers and find interesting and surprising results for most 
of the seven main countries that have participated in the EMS since its start 
and for the United Kingdom. The main results suggest that voters in France 
and Italy had revised their preferences in the direction of greater emphasis on 
lower inflation before, or early, in the EMS experience, hence giving political 
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and that,  in contrast,  voters  in Germany and the Netherlands shifted their 
preferences in the opposite direction-toward  greater emphasis on employ- 
ment-at  different points in time in the second half of the 1980s. This latter 
shift is interpreted by  the authors to imply growing political support in the 
anti-inflationary bastions for the increasing inflationary risks implied by  an 
EMS in which exchange rates have become de fact0 frozen. 
There are three reasons why I find these rationalizations of the evolution of 
the EMS less than fully convincing. 
The first is that the evaluation by consumers of the general economic situa- 
tion may depend on more macroeconomic indicators than simply the inflation 
and unemployment rates. The authors themselves point out that there is sig- 
nificant autocorrelation in several of  the national equations, which could be 
an indication of the omission of one or more explanatory variables. One likely 
candidate as omitted variable is an indicator of  the sustainability of  the gov- 
ernment’s economic policy, expressed, say, by the ratio of government debt to 
GDP-or  the rate of change of this ratio-which  has been a focal point of the 
public  debate in  several EMS countries in  the  1980s. Other possible can- 
didates are the current imbalance and an  indicator of  competitiveness; dis- 
cussion of  external imbalance has  also figured prominently  in  the evalua- 
tion of the general performance of the European economies in the 1970s and 
1980s. 
A second reason for questioning the outcome of  the empirical analysis is 
the simplified and linear way  in which the two main indicators of economic 
performance enter the preference of consumers. For example, the authors re- 
mark that German consumers appear to have shifted toward greater tolerance 
of inflation in late 1986. This was at a time when consumer prices were falling 
slightly as the combined result of  a sharp drop in oil prices and an extended 
period of tighter budgetary policies from 1982 onward. Presumably, German 
consumers recognized at the time that inflation had been dealt with quite effec- 
tively, so that concern could justifiably be expressed primarily with respect to 
observed rising  unemployment.  Conversely, French  and  Italian  consumers 
were well justified in the late 1970s and early 1980s in focusing their concerns 
on inflation, which remained stubbornly at the double-digit level. The impor- 
tance of  the level of  the two indicators disappears when the preferences are 
expressed only in terms of changes in them. 
A third reason for questioning the results-not  unrelated to the first two- 
is linked to the fact that the empirical study fails to identify shifts in prefer- 
ences at times when voter dissatisfaction with the general economic situation 
found expression in rather massive swings of the political balance. In France, 
the center-right government of President Giscard d’Estaing and Prime Minis- 
ter Raymond Barre, which had followed a steady policy of  squeezing down 
inflation-although  without much success-was  ousted from office in  198 1 
and replaced by  a socialist government committed to expansionary policies 
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shift toward greater aversion to inflation implied by the consumer survey after 
October 1979. Equally puzzling is the failure of the survey to pick up the shift 
in voter preferences expressed in the switch from a Labour to a Conservative 
government in the United Kingdom in May  1979. Given the major role that 
the  aim  of  reducing  inflation  played  in  the  campaign that  brought  Mrs. 
Thatcher to power in that election, the empirical results are surprising to an 
economist, at least. There are also less important questions with respect to the 
timing of the evolution of  preferences in some other countries, although, on 
the whole, they appear more plausible. 
The three reasons given for questioning the reliability of  the empirical re- 
sults of the paper should not be seen as a criticism of the authors’ effort to use 
previously unexploited data in a novel and imaginative way to address an im- 
portant and striking phenomenon: why a number of European countries have 
adopted changes in macroeconomic policies, going so far in a noninflationary 
direction that EC governments have now even agreed to sign a new treaty that 
recognizes price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy. 
While I fully recognize the pioneering nature of  the empirical analysis, I 
have more reservations as to the linkage made by the authors to the theoretical 
literature on commitment to price stability by  adopting an increasingly rigid 
exchange rate regime. It appears to me farfetched to assume that voters have 
influenced the choice of exchange rate regime in order to bring about a cession 
of national monetary sovereignty through participation in the EMS. The grad- 
ual evolution of the EMS that can be observed in the 1980s has become clear 
only ex post, and it seems more likely that the central banks and governments 
have participated in it as a result of their experience of  how their economies 
worked and because the central banks-with  their inherent bias toward price 
stability-have  gradually gained the upper hand in policy-making as capital 
mobility increased and monetary management became more market oriented 
and less susceptible to national preferences. 
In other words, the voters did not have to impose a shift in their preferences 
on their respective central banks; the latter were quite ready to seize the op- 
portunity to conduct policies geared increasingly to low inflation. From this 
perspective, studies of the evolution of central bank independence and of the 
decisions to liberalize capital movements and push financial integration seem 
more relevant to an explanation of changes in the EMS than an analysis of 
shifts in voter preferences. Studies of the latter may, however, be illuminating 
for evaluating to what extent such changes have been supported by the voters. 
The main conclusion of the paper is that the consumer surveys can be inter- 
preted as indicative of  such support in the higher-inflation countries. At the 
same time, the excellent results in achieving a high degree of price stability in 
the low-inflation countries by the mid- 1980s may have facilitated their accept- 
ance of a system that has entailed slightly higher inflationary risks for them 
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General Discussion 
Fred Bergsten reflected on a parallel between Germany’s current position in 
the EMS and the U.S. position at the end of Bretton Woods. He argued that 
the Germans are still devoted to fighting inflation but have lost the use of the 
exchange rate instrument under the existing EMS-hence  they have  ended 
their opposition to monetary union. This is similar to the U.S.  situation in 
1971. The United States wanted to depreciate but in that case felt that it could 
do so only by  breaking the system. Charles Wyplosz disagreed. In his view, 
Germany is running European monetary policy and has not lost its ability to 
fight inflation. The German concern with monetary union is over losing its 
monetary independence to other countries. Albert0 Giovannini argued that, as 
long as the EMS exists,  the option to realign remains. However, with  full 
monetary union, the option is no longer there. This is his explanation for why 
there is German opposition to monetary union. 
Charles Wyplosz suggested that the reason for the growing success of the 
EMS since 1979 was a flow investment by European central banks in the stock 
of credibility. During the post-Bretton  Woods period, different central banks 
have gone through different learning processes, culminating in the 1980s with 
the view that credibility was paramount. 
Sebastian Edwards wondered what the authors’ surveys were actually cap- 
turing. He thought that responses by individuals in each country to questions 
about unemployment and inflation might be strongly influenced by the overall 
level of optimism or pessimism, which in turn would be colored by exogenous 
events such as the Falklands War in the United Kingdom, capital controls in 
France, or the World Cup in Italy. 
Allan Melfzer reflected on the lessons of Bretton Woods for the EMS. He 
argued that, during the 1970s, the Germans learned that revaluation did not 
inflict permanent harm on their export industries, so they learned not to resist 
adjustment as they had in the 1960s. The French learned that the only way to 
maintain the EMS system was to disinflate and that, by doing so, there would 
not be permanent effects on unemployment. In addition to having learned the 
lesson from Bretton Woods of the need to allow adjustment, the Europeans 
(especially the Germans) did not want to continue absorbing U.S. inflation, as 
they had under Bretton Woods and throughout the 1970s. Thus, in 1979, the 
year the EMS began, the Germans told Paul Volcker at Belgrade that they 
were no longer willing to support the dollar. 